Traditional (some would say naïve) Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) infers a potential explanation of some explanandum from the claim that this inferred explanation is the best of the available potential explanations. In response to objections to this inference form, IBE’s defenders have put forward a host of hedges, alternately strengthening IBE’s premises and weakening its conclusion to make it more defensible. Contemporary (some would say sophisticated) forms of IBE typically integrate a combination of such hedges, effectively rendering them far less applicable, powerful, and simple than the traditional version. This talk argues that a proper formal defense of IBE has no need for such hedges. This is because the classic objections to IBE—along with the hedges put forward in response to these—are founded on two deep misunderstandings. We offer a more plausible and charitable understanding of “best explanation” along with a discussion of the nature and formal evaluation of inference. Once these ideas are properly understood, IBE in its simplest, “naïve” form turns out to be surprisingly defensible.